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CASENOTE

THE EVOLUTION OF QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN THE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH: CANADIAN COMMERCIAL
CORP./HEROUX, INC.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the First Congress' debate over the bill to establish
the Treasury Department, James Madison described the principal responsibility of the Comptroller of the Treasury as "deciding upon the lawfulness and justice of claims and accounts subsisting between the United States and particular citizens: this
partakes strongly of the judicial character, and there may be
strong reasons why an officer of this kind should not hold his
office at the pleasure of the Executive Branch of Government."'
* The citation format for this article generally conforms to A UNIFORM SYSTEM
OF CITATION (15th ed. 1991) except for citations to General Accounting Office and

United States Claims Court decisions. These decisions are cited according to the
format followed by the PUBLIC CONTRACTS LAW JOURNAL, printed on the first pages
of each issue. This paper will be entered in the 1995 George Hutchinson Writing
Competition sponsored by the Federal Circuit Bar Association.
1. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 611-12 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of Rep. Madison). Madison continued to describe the quasi-judicial role of the office which became
that of the Comptroller General:
I am inclined to think that we ought to consider him something in the
light of an arbitrator between the public and individuals, and that he
ought to hold his office by such a tenure as will make him responsible to
the public generally;, then again it may be thought, on the other side,
that some persons ought to be authorized on behalf of the individual,
with the usual liberty of referring to a third person, in case of disagreement, which may throw some embarrassment in the way of the first
idea.
Id. at 612. In response, members argued that "the Executive Magistrate had Consti-
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With the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,2
the General Accounting Office (GAO) was created and the responsibility to settle the accounts and supervise the recovery of
certified debts passed from the Comptroller of the Treasury to
GAO's newly created agency chief, the Comptroller General.3 In
the interest of independent and accurate accounting,4 Congress
tutionally a right to remove subordinate officers at pleasure" since "these officers
were merely to assist him in the performance of duties, which, from the nature of
man he could not execute without them . . . ." Madison replied:
I question very much whether he can or ought to have any interferences
in the settling and adjusting the [sic] legal claims of individuals against
the United States. The necessary examination and decision in such cases
partake too much of the Judicial capacity to be blended with the Executive. I do not say the office is either Executive or Judicial; I think it
rather distinct from both, though it partakes of each, and therefore some
modification, accommodated to those circumstances, ought to take place. I
would, therefore, make the officer responsible to every part of the Government.
Id. at 614. Thus, Madison sought to vest in the Comptroller of the Treasury the
"blend" of constitutional authority that he described "as essential to a free government" grounded in separate departments. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 252 (James
Madison) (Basil Blackwell ed., 2d ed. 1987); see also Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U. L. REV.
59, 70-76 (1983) (discussing Congress' long history of investigation and oversight of
the Executive Branch beginning with the creation of the Treasury Department, in
general, and the Comptroller of the Treasury, specifically, in the Act of Sept. 2, 1789,
ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65 (1789) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 301 (1988)).
2. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (codified at 31 U.S.C.
§ 701 (1982) and other scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
3. 31 U.S.C. § 3526 (1988).
4. 58 Cong. Rec. 7085 (1919) (remarks of Rep. Good, Chairman, Special Committee on the Budget.)
By creating this department, Congress will have applied a practical business policy to the administration of the Government's fiscal affairs. Men
will be employed as auditors who owe their positions to their training
and ability and who do not secure their positions as a reward for political service. They will be fearless in their examinations, and can criticize,
without fear of removal, executives who misuse appropriations or whose
offices are conducted in an inefficient manner. Congress and its committees will at all times be able to consult with officials of this department
regarding expenditures and from it will be able to obtain the most reliable information regarding the use to which any appropriation has been
put or the efficiency of any department of the Government. This independent department will necessarily serve as a check against extravagance
in the preparation of the budget. Those appointed by the president and
charged with the duty of assisting him in collecting data and in preparing the budget will realize that their every act and decision will come
under the close scrutiny of the accounting department. If duplications,
inefficiency, waste, and extravagance exist as the result of any expenditure, the President will be held responsible therefor if he continues to
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removed this important function from the Executive Branch and
vested it in an officer removable only by congressional action.5
From its creation, GAO has provided a forum for the resolution
of protests arising from government contract actions.6 Until the
passage of the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984' (CICA),
GAO founded its authority to decide these matters through an
admittedly expansive interpretation of the traditional authority

ask for appropriations to continue such practices. The knowledge on the
part of every executive and bureau chief that such an independent and
fearless department exists, and that every act and deed they will perform
will come under the closest scrutiny of this department, will in itself
force a much higher degree of efficiency in every department of the Government.
Id.; see also id. at 7093 (statement of Rep. Madden).
It is proposed to create this auditor and comptroller general so that he
may be able to pass on all of the legal phases of every expenditure and
at the same time audit the accounts and to make him so independent of
the executive branch of the Government that no influence of any kind
can be exercised over him in the discharge of his duties.
Id.
5. 61 CONG. REC. 982 (1921) (statement of Rep. Good). The Comptroller General
is appointed by the President for a 15-year non-renewable term and can be removed
"only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance in office or conduct involving moral
turpitude" upon a concurrent resolution of Congress or by impeachment. Id. at 991;
31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1) (1988) (reflecting the compromise required for passage of the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 that modified the concurrent resolution discussed
supra to a joint resolution requiring the President's signature). President Wilson vetoed the measure in 1920 because of the removal provisions. 61 CONG. REC. 982
(statement of Rep. Good). See FREDERICK C. MOSHER, A TALE OF TWO AGENCIES 1332 (1984), for a detailed history of the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of
1921. See also 31 U.S.C. § 703(a) (1988). When a vacancy occurs, the President may
appoint a new Comptroller General from a list of at least three candidates recommended by a commission comprised of the Speaker of the House, the President pro
tempore of the Senate, the minority and majority leaders of the House and Senate,
and the chairmen and ranking minority members of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government Operations. Id.
6. See 1 Comp. Gen. 21 (1921) (regarding a contract for insuring registered
mail). The first reported case, 4 Comp. Gen. 880 (1925), required the Department of
the Interior to make a complete award to the lowest bidder for a surveying contract
instead of splitting the work between the low bidder and the next lowest bidder. See
4 Comp. Gen. 1035 (1925); 4 Comp. Gen. 429 (1924); 4 Comp. Gen. 191 (1924); 3
Comp. Gen. 862 (1924); 3 Comp. Gen. 304 (1923); 2 Comp. Gen. 739 (1923); 2 Comp.
Gen. 544 (1923); 1 Comp. Gen. 232 (1921) for other advanced decisions on procurement questions. See also W. NOEL KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS UNDER THE FED-

ERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION, § 33.2(a) (1986); James M. Weitzel, Jr., GAO Bid
Protest Procedures Under the Competition in Contracting Act: Constitutional Implications After Buckley and Chadha, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 485, 496 (1985).
7. Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 2701-2753, 98 Stat. 495, 1175-1203 (1984) (codified at
31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556 (1988)).
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to settle accounts of the Treasury inherited by the Comptroller
General.8 CICA formally authorized GAO's bid protest
function,9 began the development of GAO's current bid protest
process, ° and placed the agency firmly in the middle of a
clash between congressional contract reform and an Executive
Branch "contracting out" movement that demanded deference to
contracting agencies.1 '
At the signing ceremony for the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
(which contained CICA), President Reagan declared war on
GAO's new statutory authority, stating: "I must vigorously
object to certain provisions that would unconstitutionally attempt to delegate to the Comptroller General of the United
States, an officer of Congress, the power to perform duties and
responsibilities that in our constitutional system may be performed only by officials of the Executive Branch." 2 The President directed Attorney General Meese to formulate a policy for
Executive Branch compliance with CICA "consistent with the
Constitution." 3 As a result of this directive, the Department of
Justice issued a memorandum that was subsequently formalized
in an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Bulletin instructing Executive agencies not to comply with 14certain provisions of CICA that it considered unconstitutional.
This open hostility to GAO's quasi-judicial role under CICA
resulted in Justice Department challenges in the Third 5 and
8. 36 Comp. Gen. 513, 514 (1957). See John Cibinic, Jr. & Jesse E. Lasken, The
Comptroller General and Government Contracts, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 349 (1970) for
a detailed analysis of the history of GAO's authority to decide government contract
cases before CICA.
9. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556 (1988).
10. Id; Eldon H. Crowell & David T. Ralston, Jr., The New Government Contracts
Bid Protest Law, 15 PUB. CONT. L.J. 177 (1985) (detailing the provisions of and controversy surrounding CICA); see also 4 C.F.R. § 21.0-21.12 (1993) (current GAO bid
protest regulations developed under CICA).
11. Alex D. Tomaszczuk & John E. Jensen, The Adjudicatory Arm of Congress-The GAO's Sixty-Year Role in Deciding Government Contract Bid Protests Comes under Renewed Attack by the Department of Justice, 29 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 399,
400 (1992) ("GAO has in essence become the battleground in a rather unique struggle
between the Executive and Legislative Branches of our government over who has the
power to monitor the billions of dollars of federal contracts awarded each fiscal
year."); OMB Circ. A-76 (Aug. 1983).
12. Crowell & Ralston, supra note 10, at 206 app. C.
13. Id. at 183, 206 app. C.
14. 0MB Bull. No. 85-8 (Dec. 17, 1984).
15. Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 607 F. Supp. 962
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Ninth 6 Circuits as well as the United States Claims Court
(Court of Federal Claims)." Despite these tests, GAO has matured into a powerful independent administrative forum
safeguarding the rights of government contract bidders to fair
competition under all relevant laws and regulations. The Canadian Commercial Corp./Heroux, Inc. (Heroux)8 case not only
provides an excellent example of the independence and quasijudicial activism with which GAO now resolves bid protest
matters, but it also illustrates the tension between the ends of
competitive government contracting and deference to Executive
Branch contracting initiatives. In sustaining Heroux's protest
against the Air Force, GAO recommended the reversal of the
Air Force's decision to award the contract to one of its own
depot maintenance divisions on the sole basis that the Defense
Contracting Audit Agency (DCAA) failed to certify the division's
bid as required under the 1993 Department of Defense Appropriations Act 9 (Appropriations Act). Finding DCAA's action to
be an unreasonable interpretation of the Appropriations Act,
GAO applied its own unique hybrid of the Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.20 test. GAO allowed
the protester to successfully challenge action taken by a noncontracting agency that was attempting to effect a "permissible
construction" of a statute it was authorized to administer.2 '
GAO synthesized its own case law with federal common law to
find Heroux to be the low bidder, a decision that furthered its
independent goal at the expense of Executive Branch
discretion.'

(D.N.J. 1985), modified and affd, 787 F.2d 875 (3rd Cir. 1986), affd on reh'g, 809
F.2d 979 (1986), cert. granted, 485 U.S. 958 (1988), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918
(1988).
16. Lear Siegler, Inc., v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988).
17. 441 4th St. Ltd. Partnership v. United States, Cl. Ct. No. 91-1692, Sept. 22,
1992, 38 CCF 76,408.
144 (1994), affd on recon., Comp. Gen. B18. 72 Comp. Gen. 312, 93-2 CPD
253278.3, April 7, 1994, 94-1 CPD T 247.
19. Pub. L. No. 102-396, § 9095, 106 Stat. 1876, 1924 (1992); see also National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 381, 106 Stat.
2315, 2392 (1992); 40 U.S.C. § 759(h) (1988) (codifying CICA's expansion of the General Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals to allow review of bid protests involving automatic data processing).
20. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
21. Id. at 842-45.
144 (1994) (citing Hoboken Shipyards, Inc.,
22. 72 Comp. Gen. 312, 93-2 CPD
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Parts II and III of this casenote will analyze the remarkable
evolution of GAO's bid protest function to near independent
regulatory agency status with Part III examining the Heroux
decision in detail. Under the Supreme Court's holding in
Bowsher v. Synar,' however, President Reagan's view of GAO
prevailed-the Comptroller General was held to be an agent of
Congress.24 After determining whether GAO's application of
the Chevron test could withstand judicial review, Part IV will
explore the constitutional implications of a Legislative branch
agency applying federal case law to challenge Executive Branch
agency action.
II. THE REMARKABLE EVOLUTION OF GAO's BID PROTEST
FUNCTION

A. The Authority to Settle Claims
The Comptroller of the Treasury was one of six offices created within the Department of the Treasury by the Act of September 2, 1789.5 The Comptroller was to "certify the balances"
of public accounts and countersign all Treasury warrants collecting the debts of the United States. 6 The original Treasury
scheme soon proved unworkable and was substantially modified
decentralizing the settlement of accounts." As a result, GAO
was created with "[aill powers and duties which on June 30,
1921, were conferred or imposed by law upon the Comptroller
of the Treasury or the six auditors of the Treasury Department ....

Principal among these powers were the certifica-

tion of balances "as final and conclusive upon the executive
branch of the government"29 and the subjection of personal
liability upon a disbursing officer after finding that a payment
70 and Newport News ShipComp. Gen. B-224184.2, Jan. 20, 1987, 87-1 CPD
building and Dry Dock Co., Comp. Gen. B-221888, July 2, 1986, 86-2 CPD 23, affd
on recon., Comp. Gen. B-221888.2, Oct. 15, 1986, 86-2 CPD T 428, to analogize the
contract under protest to a cost reimbursement contract).
23. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
24. Id. at 731-32.
25. Cibinic & Lasken, supra note 8, at 352.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 353-54.
28. Id. at 355 (emphasis added) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 44 (1964)).
29. Id. (citing Act of Mar. 30, 1868, 15 Stat. 4).
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was not made "in pursuance of the law.""° Despite a 68-year
old Executive Branch position that disappointed bidders for
government contracts had no grounds to challenge awards, s"
GAO interpreted these powers as providing the authority to
hear bid protests; it reported its first decision in 1925.2 This
interpretation was questioned by many, including GAO itself.3 3
Yet, GAO remained the only bid protest forum until protesters
were granted federal court standing in 1970."4
No Comptroller General has ever taken the position that
GAO's bid protest decisions are binding upon Executive Branch
agencies." However, the possibility that GAO could disallow a
payment contrary to a bid protest decision and impose personal
liability on the contracting officer for the illegal payment ex-

plains much of the long history of agency compliance with these
decisions.36 A second explanation for agency acquiescence is
the substantial deference afforded the government in these
actions. 7 Before 1972, GAO adjudicated protests with informal

30. Id. at 358-59 (footnotes omitted); KEYES, supra note 6, § 33.2.
31. Weitzel, supra note 6, at 494-95.
32. Id. at 496; see also 4 Comp. Gen. 880 (1925).
33. 36 Comp. Gen. 513, 514 (1957).
34. Scanwell Lab., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (granting
standing and reversing a line of cases beginning with Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,
310 U.S. 113 (1940) which denied standing in federal court to disappointed bidders).
35. 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1988); 4 C.F.R. § 21.6 (1993).
36. Cibnic & Lasken, supra note 8, at 359-60; See 44 Comp. Gen. 221 (1964)
(recognizing GAO's authority to take such action); Tomaszczuk & Jensen, supra note
11, at 405; e.g. United States ex. rel. Brookfield Constr. Co. v. Stewart, 234 F. Supp.
94 (D.D.C. 1964).
Applying these principles to the case at bar, the decision of the Comptroller General in this instance is equivalent to an announcement that if
the contract were made with the plaintiffs, he would disallow any payments that might be made by any disbursing officer thereunder. As a
practical matter, no disbursing officer would make any such payments in
the face of this ruling. To be sure, it would still be open to the plaintiffs
to bring suit against the United States in the Court of Claims for any
amount claimed to be due under the agreement. It was proper and prudent, however, for the Architect of the Capitol, acting under the direction
and supervision of the House Office Building Commission, to decline to
enter into a contract under such circumstances, because it would be undesirable and inexpedient to take a step that might tie up a large Government building project in litigation.
Stewart, 234 F. Supp. at 100.
37. Tomaszczuk & Jensen, supra note 11, at 403. This deference continues even
today. For example, from 1984 to 1993 GAO has closed about 2600 cases per year
with approximately 800 decided on the merits. Of those 800, GAO's sustain rate has
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procedures that afforded protesters limited procedural rights."5
There were no hearings, only informal conferences in which all
interested parties could present their positions.3 9 Frequent factual disputes arose as a result of the lack of a fact finding
structure.4 ° GAO uniformly decided issues of fact in favor of
the agency: "We have consistently held that where there are
disputed questions of fact, in the absence of evidence sufficiently convincing to overcome the presumption of the correctness of
the administrative report, this Office will accept the administrative report as accurately reflecting the disputed facts."4
A third reason that Executive Branch agencies have historically followed GAO decisions is the nature of agency participation in the bid protest process. Although decisions on procurement policy often affect the Executive as a whole, each case

remained between ten and sixteen percent. 61 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 4 (Jan. 31,
1994). See infra note 44, for pre-CICA statistics.
38. Cibinic & Lasken, supra note 8, at 374-75; John B. Tieder, Jr. & John H.
Tracy, Forums and Remedies for Disappointed Bidders on Federal Government Contracts, 10 PUB. CONT. L.J. 92, 95 (1978). In 1975, GAO revised temporary bid protest
regulations promulgated in 1972. Id.; see also Alexander J. Brittin, The Comptroller
General's Dual Statutory Authority to Decide Bid Protests, 12 PUB. CONT. L.J. 636,
638-39 (1993) (discussing the reasons behind the enactment of the 1972 and 1975
regulations).
39. Tomaszczuk & Jensen, supra note 11, at 405.
40. Report of the Bid Protest Committee, The Protest Experience Under the Competition in Contracting Act, 1989 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. CONT. L. REP. 81-82. Even under
CICA an effective fact finding structure did not exist before the 1991 regulations. Id.
GAO bid protest regulations now provide for adversarial hearings and protective orders that allow protesters access to all relevant documents. 4 C.F.R. §§ 21.3, 21.5
(1993). After the filing of a timely protest, GAO notifies the agency which in turn
has 25 working days to file a report including all solicitation and bid documents
(particularly those requested to be produced in the protest) used to make the challenged award and respond to the protester's claims. The awardee is also allowed to
comment on the protest. The protester receives copies of the agency report as well as
the comments of interested parties and is given ten days to comment. Failure to file
timely comments results in dismissal of the protest. The protester may request additional production of documents after reviewing the agency report. GAO may ask for
further submissions, and either party may request a hearing. 4 C.F.R. §§ 21.1 to .5
(1993); see OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BID PROTESTS AT GAO: A DESCRIPTIVE GUIDE (1991) (a protester's guide to GAO

(call (202) 275-6241 to obtain a copy)). GAO may, however, conduct a hearing solely
on its own initiative. TRI-COR Indus., Comp. Gen. B-252366, Aug. 25, 1993, 93-2
CPD 137 (denying the protester's argument that the hearing call by GAO was ultra
vires).
41. 42 Comp. Gen. 124, 134 (1962).
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generally only involves one agency.42 The agency representatives who award contracts and defend bid protests are not
agency heads but contracting officers interested in completing
the award process and having a qualified contractor begin
workY If GAO's decisions routinely required the participation
of more than one agency or involved functions of the agency
head, the Comptroller General's authority would certainly have
been challenged. Heroux, an excellent example of the difficulty
and congressional pressure that can accompany this type of
case, involved both the Air Force and DCAA. Its holding invalidated DCAA's interpretation of appropriation language, which
was a classic agency-head function.'
B. The "ContractingOut" Initiative
In the 1970's GAO promulgated regulations under which a
much more neutral forum for protesters developed,45 and the
number of protests began to rise markedly.' This trend ex-

42. Cibinic & Lasken, supra note 8,at 378-79.
43. Id.
44. In the wake of the Heroux decision, Congress has promulgated legislation
which disputes the decision, infra note 130 and accompanying text, as well as revising the section of the Appropriations Act in question, infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
45. 4 C.F.R. § 20 (1975); see also Thomas D. Morgan, The General Accounting
Office: One Hope for Congress to Regain Parity of Power with the President, 51 N.C.
L. Rev. 1279, 1367 (1973) (arguing for the creation of a new division in GAO to resolve bid protests and the development of procedures to address the lack of due process in the current system); Tieder & Tracy, supra note 38, at 95; Tomaszczuk &
Jensen, supra note 11, at 403. But see Cibinic & Lasken, supra note 8,at 394 (proposing that procurement law be revised so that decisions made in good faith by contracting officers would be "final and binding" on government, thereby precluding GAO
review).
46. Wheelabrator Corp. v Chafee, 455 F.2d. 1306, 1314 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
GAO decided only 206 cases on their merits in 1967 with 169 protests denied and
seventeen sustained. In 1968, however, these numbers rose to 569 cases decided on
the merits, 539 of which were denied and thirty sustained. Id. This increase is directly attributable to the promulgation of GAO's first bid protest regulations in 1967.
Tomaszczuk & Jensen, supra note 11, at 403. In 1971, a year before GAO issued
temporary revised regulations, 715 protests were decided on the merits with 641
denied and seventy-four sustained, 455 F.2d at 1314 n.10, compared with 887 filed,
24 sustained in 1973, Morgan, supra note 45, at 1338 n.204 (citing Fed. Cont. Rep.
(BNA) No. 483, at A-4 (June 4, 1973)). In 1979, 1577 protests were filed reflecting
the effect of the 1975 regulations. Tomaszczuk & Jensen, supra note 11, at 403 n.24
(citing 41 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 239, 239-40 (Feb. 13, 1984)).
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ploded in the 1980's as the Reagan administration implemented
the recommendations of the Grace Commission." In 1983, the
commission reported that the government could save $474 million a year by 1986 if it aggressively contracted for the multitude of support services provided by in-house resources.' This
report led to the revision of OMB Circular A-76 (A-76) which
was originally published in 1966. 4' A prior revision had created the Cost Comparison Handbook and provided a method for
conducting comparisons of government cost estimates and bids
by private contractors. 50 However, the revised 1983 A-76 and
supplement required agencies to perform cost comparison studies for all activities to which more than ten full-time employees
were assigned and for which over $100,000 was budgeted. If an
agency determined that private commercial sources capable of
replacing the activity in question existed, a cost estimate of the
in-house performance of the activity was prepared using the
Cost Comparison Handbook and submitted along with the private bids opened by the contracting officer.51
This process began the competition between government
entities and private bidders. Agencies acting under A-76 utilized
the procurement process to ensure that the in-house activity
was more cost efficient than any private contractor by issuing a
solicitation for the activity and canceling it upon a finding that
the government cost estimate was the lowest bid. 2 GAO initially found that "agencies may perform work in-house. Such

47. KEYES, supra note 6, at § 7.2(a)-(b). GAO resolved a record 2425 cases in
1983. 45 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 309 (Feb. 24, 1986). This mark was not topped until
1985 when CICA took effect and GAO resolved 2626. Id.
48. A Congressional Budget Office report estimated a $335,000,000 first-year savings eventually reaching $870,000,000 yearly. KEYES, supra note 6, § 7.2(a)-(b).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at § 7.2(b)-(c).
The key to a make or buy decision is a comparison of the government's
costs with a supplier's prices. An agency's decision to continue work inhouse will be upheld where the agency accurately makes a cost comparison showing that contracting out is less costly. The Office of Management
and Budget "Cost Comparison Handbook" prescribes the overall policies
and detailed procedures required of all agencies in making cost comparisons between contractor and Government performance.
Id. at § 7.2(b) (footnotes omitted).
52. Id. § 7.2(b). The cost of contracting must be at least ten percent less than the
government cost estimate. Id.
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decisions are matters of Executive policy and not within the
decisionmaking functions of the General Accounting Office,"53
even when it was clear that the government cost estimate was
erroneous and the decision to cancel the solicitation was detrimental to the procurement system.54 However, this deference
was not long-lived. In 1979, GAO reversed its position by holding that:

[wihen, ... an agency utilizes the procurement system to
aid in its decisionmaking, spelling out in a solicitation the
circumstances under which the government will award/not
award a contract, we believe it would be detrimental to the
system if, after the agency induces the submission of bids,
there is a faulty or misleading cost comparison which materially affects the decision as to whether a contract will be
awarded.55
Some four years before the Grace Commission revision to A-76
and five years before the passage of CICA, GAO intervened in a
process its own case law considered to involve issues of pure
agency discretion in order to protect the integrity of the procurement system.56 GAO's review of A-76 protests was limited
to the question of whether the agency's cost comparison was
53. Kahoe Enter. Inc., Comp. Gen. B-183866, June 17, 1976, 76-1 CPD T 389;
accord To the Ass'n of Cinema Labs, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-170079, Sept. 15, 1970, 1970
WL 4349 (letter from Comptroller General); To Krause, Lindsay and Nahstoll, Comp.
Gen. B-161862, Sept. 14, 1967, 1967 WL 2685 (letter from Comptroller General).
54. Kahoe Enter., 76-1 CPD 389; Service is Basic, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-186332,
Oct. 1, 1976, 76-2 CPD T 302.
55. Crown Laundry and Dry Cleaners, Inc., Comp Gen. B-194505, July 18, 1979,
79-2 CPD T 38.
56. The GAO intervened when the protester was an "interested party" as defined
under 4 C.F.R. 21.0 (1975) ("an actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct
economic interest would be affected by the award of a contract or by a failure to
award a contract") Comp. Gen. B-210188, Jan. 17, 1983, 83-1 CPD 52 (declining to
review A-76 procurement challenge raised on behalf of the federal employees of Fort
Eustis and taxpayers generally). E.g., Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1954,
Comp. Gen. B-207359, Oct. 7, 1982, 82-2 CPD 315 (finding union protest of a decision to contract for services instead of using government employees not reviewable).
But see Robert F. Catania, Contracting Out: Management and Labor at War under
Section 7106 of the Civil Service Reform Act, 16 PuB. CoNT. L.J. 287, 296 (1986)
(urging GAO to reverse its position because it "is uniquely qualified to make determinations regarding contracting out protests"). The GAO also intervened when the protester had exhausted all available agency appeals. Urban Enter., Comp. Gen. B201619, Feb. 17, 1981, 81-1 CPD 91101; Direct Delivery Sys., 59 Comp. Gen. 465, 801 CPD 91343 (1980).
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correct and prepared in good faith, but these cases clearly shifted the focus of GAO's bid protest function from the protection
of the public fisc to the protection of bidders' rights to fair
competition.57 In Heroux, GAO continued this shift by concentrating its analysis on the accuracy of the government cost
estimate and DCAA's audit. Competition between government
cost estimates and private bids uniquely illustrated the contention forwarded by congressional contract reformers under
CICA-that waste and inefficiency should be addressed through
the promotion of fair competition. Fair competition was promoted by GAO's activist review of these cases but the administration of A-76 was unquestionably burdened.5 8
C. CICA-GAO as an Agent of Congressional Contract Reform
CICA's passage was the direct result of over a decade of
congressional investigation of waste in the federal procurement
system.59 Its sponsors observed that "competition has become
the exception rather than the rule," with the government
awarding over $100 billion in noncompetitive contracts in 1983
alone. 6' The insertion of the CICA bid protest provisions in the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, however, only codified the existing process and purpose of GAO's bid protest function.6 ' Proclaiming as its purpose the establishment of advocates for the
enhancement of accountability and the strengthening of the bid
protest process,62 CICA hardly thrust GAO into a new role.'
57. Integrity Management Intl, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-207700, Nov. 4, 1982, 82-2
CPD
407; Dynetaria, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-205487, June 1, 1982, 82-1 CPD T 506.
58. RCA Serv. Co., Comp. Gen. B-208204, Apr. 22, 1983, 83-1 CPD 1 435 (holding
that the agency must re-analyze the government estimate and private offers in light
of an amendment to the original Request For Proposals (RFP) before it can properly
cancel the solicitation and perform the work in-house).
59. Tomaszczuk & Jensen, supra note 11, at 407 n.28 (citing COMMISSION ON
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT (1972) and H.R. REP. No. 1157, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1017 (1984)).
60. H.R. REP. NO. 138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1985). See JOHN D. HANRAHAN,
GOVERNMENT By CONTRACT 226-72 (1983) for an insider's view of the Reagan
Administration's extensive use of noncompetitive contracting.
61. Crowell & Ralston, supra note 10, at 178-79. The conference committee inserted the CICA provisions without any prior House or Senate consideration. Id.
62. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1445 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2123.
63. The Armed Services Procurement Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2301 (1988) and the Feder-
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Recognizing this, the conference report noted that CICA merely
provided GAO with a "statutory base"" by adding "a new subchapter to Chapter 35 of Title 31, United States Code, which
codifies and strengthens the bid protest function currently in
operation at the General Accounting Office (GAO)." 5 This
strengthening was in the form of additional pre- and post-decision mechanisms. The pre-decision mechanism was the provision of an automatic stay of contract performance where protests were filed and the agency notified within ten days of the
award.6 6 This stay could only be circumvented by the head of
the procuring agency upon a finding that the continued performance of the awarded contract was either in the best interests
of the United States or that urgent and compelling circumstances did not permit the agency to wait for the decision. 7 The
additional post-decision mechanism under CICA was the authority to award attorney's fees and the requirement that agencies report to GAO within sixty days any noncompliance with
the recommendations of a GAO decision.6 8 This noncompliance
would then be transmitted to Congress in an annual report
detailing all Executive Branch defiance.69
D. Caught in the Crossfire
In 1985, GAO reported only two instances of agency noncompliance with its recommendations, but compliance with CICA's
stay provision was another matter.7" In an April 20, 1984, let-

al Property and Administrative Services Act, 41 U.S.C. § 251 (1988) were also modifled. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556; see also JOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR., FORNATION OF GOVERNmENT CONTRACTS 287-97 (2d ed. 1986).
64. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861.
65. Id.

66. 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1), (d)(1) (1988).
67. 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2)-(d)(2) (1988). GAO has no recourse to enforce a stay in
the face of such a finding communicated in writing. 4 C.F.R. § 21.4(b)(1)-(2) (1993).
68. GAO may also award bid preparation costs. 4 C.F.R. § 21.6(d) (1993).
69. 31 U.S.C. § 3554(e) (1988).
70. 45 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 309 (Feb. 24, 1986); see also 61 Fed. Cont. Rep.
(BNA) 5 (Feb. 7, 1994) (reporting only one instance of noncompliance in 1993); 59
Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 5 (Feb. 8, 1993) (two instances in 1992); 57 Fed. Cont. Rep.
(BNA) 6 (Feb. 10, 1992) (no instances reported in 1991); accord Tomaszczuk &
Jensen, supra note 11, at 410 n.49 (citing a Letter from the Comptroller General to
the Honorable Dan Quayle (R-Ind.), President of the Senate, B-158766 (Jan. 31,
1992)).
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ter to the Chairman of the House Government Operations Committee, Jack Brooks, Assistant Attorney General Robert A.
McConnell communicated the Justice Department's position that
certain CICA provisions, as proposed, violated the separation of
powers doctrine under Buckley v. Valeo71 and "intended to create an even greater limit on the traditional broad discretion of
executive agencies to conduct procurement activities than is
now in existence." 72 The Justice Department's objections centered around the automatic stay and award of attorney's fees
provisions.7' The automatic stay, the letter argued, allowed the
Comptroller General to suspend indefinitely agency action and
constituted a form of constitutionally prohibited committee
approval of Executive action.74 The authority to award fees
was challenged as violative of the American rule75 and an improper exercise of Legislative branch authority.
Whether this authority is analyzed as GAO's performing a
judicial function which is binding on an executive agency,

71. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
72. 42 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 122-124, reprinted in Crowell & Ralston, supra note
10, at 200 app. A.
73. Id. The McConnell letter also challenged the federal judiciary's authority to
refer cases to GAO as outside the authority of Articles I or III of the U.S. Constitution:
First, § 204(b)(1) authorizes referrals from federal courts, in apparent
violation of both Article I and Article III of the Constitution. It is not
clear at what stage in a judicial proceeding the court would make the
referral or whether GAO's recommendation would be an advisory opinion
to the court or a final opinion to the parties. In either case, it would
appear that GAO would be operating as some kind of adjunct to the
judiciary. We are not aware of any authority in the Constitution that
permits the Legislative Branch to provide advisory opinions to the Judicial Branch regarding pending cases. Article I authorizes the Legislative
Branch to make laws, not to interpret them after they have been enacted. That task is given, under Article III, to the Judicial Branch. Thus,
even if judges were inclined to ask for assistance, we believe that it
would be unconstitutional for the Legislative Branch to provide it. It
would raise equally serious problems under Article III if this section were
read to permit GAO to render a final opinion to the parties, thereby
usurping the judiciary's function. We therefore oppose the references to
'any court of the United States' in § 204(b)(1), and urge its deletion.
Id. at 198-99. See Crowell & Ralston, supra note 10, at 194-97, for a discussion of
the proposed rules for the award of attorney's fees and bid preparation costs under
CICA.
74. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
75. 42 Fed. Cont. Rep. at 124.
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or as GAO's rendering an administrative decision for the
Executive Branch, it is clearly unconstitutional. Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The doctrine of separation of powers does not, except in certain very limited circumstances,
permit the legislature or any of its parts to bind the Executive Branch except by passage of a law. Nor does it permit
the Legislative Branch to execute the law by determining
how contracts should be awarded or to adjudicate claims
against the Executive Branch. 6
This letter spawned President Reagan's statement at the signing ceremony challenging the stay and attorney's fees provisions, an Office of Legal Counsel's memorandum determining
these provisions to be unconstitutional, and an OMB Bulletin
directing Executive agencies not to comply with GAO action
under either provision.7 7 A judicial challenge quickly followed
these policy actions. Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps
7 8 involved a protester, Ameron, seeking a prelimiof Engineers
nary injunction to enforce a CICA stay of a pipe-cleaning contract pending GAO's decision.79 The Justice Department defended the Army Corps, asserting the unconstitutionality of
CICA's stay authority, and both the House and Senate intervened in support of CICA and Ameron. 0 The district court
upheld the constitutionality of the stay authority and granted
the injunction, finding GAO's bid protest function to be analogous to that of an independent agency.8 The court noted that
the Comptroller General is appointed by the President and
therefore may properly exercise Executive authority.82 Applying
the analysis used by the Supreme Court in Humphrey's Executor v. United States," which upheld the constitutionality of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the court found GAO's role
under CICA to be that of an agency-independent of Executive
or Legislative control-constitutionally exercising Executive

76. Id. (footnotes omitted).
77. Tomaszczuk & Jensen, supra note 11, at 415-16.
78. 607 F. Supp. 962 (D.N.J. 1985).

79. Id.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 963.
Id. at 970-74.
Id. at 972.
295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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authority." In support of this conclusion, the court observed
that the Comptroller General is removable by joint resolution of
Congress only for good cause, that GAO exercises quasi-judicial
and quasi-legislative authority in resolving its bid protest matters, and that the bid protest function is insulated from congressional interference.8 5
On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld the district court's reasoning and found the Comptroller General, who is appointed for
a fifteen-year non-renewable term, "to be one of the most independent officers in the whole of the federal government...
whose functions are drawn from each of the branches." 8 Identifying GAO's bid protest function as falling within the "headless 'fourth branch' of government," the court stressed GAO's
historical independence.87 The court speculated (accurately)
that the Justice Department's true motivation for the present
challenge was Attorney General Meese's position that in a
proper constitutional scheme the independent agencies that
comprise this "fourth branch" would fall under Executive
Branch control.8 8 In affirming the district court, the Third Circuit not only disagreed with the Attorney General's view of the
Constitution, but also the recent decision of a three-judge panel
of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
in Synar v. United States.8 9 Synar struck down portions of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act vesting the authority to mandate
certain budget cuts in the Comptroller General, an officer removable by joint resolution of Congress. Applying Humphrey's
Executor, the Third Circuit noted its disagreement with Synar's
holding, concluded that the possible congressional removal of
the Comptroller General precluded any grant of Executive authority to GAO, and upheld Congress' power to create independent agencies with functions drawn from all three branches. 0
In testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary,

84. 607 F. Supp. at 972-74.
85. Id.
86. Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps. of Engineers, 787 F.2d 875, 885
(3d Cir. 1986).
87. Id. at 886.
88. Id. at 887 n.6.
89. 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986).
90. 787 F.2d at 885-87.
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Mr. Meese threatened not to follow any adverse resolution of
Ameron until "the Supreme Court finally laid the matter to
rest."9 Synar reached the Supreme Court as Bowsher v.
Synar9 2 and seemed to provide the result for which Mr. Meese
had hoped. The Court held that "because Congress has retained
removal authority over the Comptroller General, he may not be
entrusted with executive powers.""3 The Comptroller General's
duties under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings were viewed "as plainly
entailing execution of the law in constitutional terms."9 4 In the
wake of Bowsher, Ameron was reargued with the Justice Department adding a challenge to CICA's fee provision.9 5 The
Bowsher Court observed that "[i]nterpreting a law enacted by
Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the law."96 The Justice Department
seized on this language in framing its Ameron II reargument
contending that: (1) the Comptroller General's ability to shorten
or lengthen a stay constituted the authority to execute CICA;
(2) the control of the procurement process afforded the Comptroller General by CICA was an improper authorization to execute procurement law; and (3) that CICA authorizes "excessive
legislative interference in a domain the Constitution assigns to
the executive [sic] ." 9
The Third Circuit refused to consider the newly added fee
challenge on ripeness grounds since Ameron never had a claim
for attorney's fees.9" On the question of the stay provision,
CICA once again prevailed. Limiting Bowsher's application to
grants of authority to "direct the exercise of Presidential authority" to the Comptroller General as was the case with
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings' budget cutting authority, the court
concluded that "the mere fact that a non-executive government
official interprets the law, however, does not in and of itself

91. Id. at 890.
92. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
93. Id. at 732.
94. Id. at 733.
95. Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps. of Engineers, 809 F.2d 979 (3d
Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Ameron Il].
96. 478 U.S. at 733.
97. 809 F.2d at 989.
98. Id. at 988. Ameron's protest was denied by GAO. Ameron, Inc., Comp. Gen.
B-218262, April 29, 1985, 85-1 CPD 485.
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mean that this official infringes on the President's authority to
execute the law."99 The Ameron I decision, reflecting
Bowsher's holding that GAO is an agent of the Legislative
branch examined the challenge in terms of pure congressional
authority.' The court held CICA to be a proper exercise of
congressional power which neither improperly delegated power
previously given to the Executive, nor granted GAO the authority to execute procurement law.'' The contract reform that
motivated the passage of CICA, the court continued, was a
purpose that clearly outweighed the "limited potential disruption" of the procurement process. 10 2
Mr. Meese's victory in Bowsher may not have convinced the
Third Circuit to reverse itself, but it did transform GAO's bid
protest function under Ameron from that of a constitutional,
independent agency to "meaningful oversight by an agent of
Congress. " 10 3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but Con-

gress compromised by amending CICA to require that GAO
issue decisions at least ninety working days from receipt, and
the Justice Department withdrew its petition.' 4
The constitutionality of CICA's fee provision was challenged
again in a 1992 suit seeking declaratory relief. The defendants
in United States v. Instruments, S.A., Inc.'05 prevailed on summary judgment with the court holding that the challenge was
"not ripe for decision and [that] prudential concerns counsel[ed]
against declaratory relief."'05 The court's ripeness determination hinged upon a similar challenge in the Court of Federal
Claims that had not been renewed after GAO amended its
regulations under CICA in 1991.107

99. Id. at 990; see also Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988) (upholding the
appointment procedures for independent counsels under the Ethics and Government
Act of 1978 which involve all three branches).
100. 809 F.2d at 988-99.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 997-98.
103. Id. at 998.
104. Tomaszczuk & Jensen, supra note 11, at 419 n.95.
105. 807 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1992).
106. Id. at 815; Tomaszczuk & Jensen, supra note 11, at 400 (discussing the
threat that Instruments, S.A. could hold for GAO's bid protest function).
107. 807 F. Supp. at 814-15.
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Despite the Justice Department's assault, GAO's statutory
authority under CICA emerged virtually unscathed. 1 8 The Executive tried to affect a judicial line item veto and failed. Notwithstanding Bowsher and Ameron II, GAO's 1991 bid protest
regulations reasserted a role for the bid protest function analogous to that of an independent agency.'0 9 Under these regulations, GAO can issue protective orders and hold hearings allowing protesters access to more information and ensuring the
development of an adequate record."0 The Heroux case involved both a protective order and a hearing, and it is questionable whether the protest could have been sustained without

them."'
III. CANADIAN COMMERCIAL CORPORATIONJHEROUX, INC.
A. The Protest
Heroux, Inc. held the contract for the repair and overhaul of
aircraft landing gear at Ogden Air Force base for twenty years
prior to the passage of the 1993 Department of Defense Appropriations Act"' (Appropriations Act). Section 9095 of the Appropriations Act authorized competition between Department of
Defense (DOD) maintenance activities and private contractors."' The resulting competition was substantially similar to
that under A-76 in that the government estimate was prepared
using a cost comparability handbook,"" and once the compara-

108. In the Ninth Circuit, CICA was not only found to be constitutional, but the
government's refusal to comply was found to constitute bad faith. Lear Siegler, Inc. v.
Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1110-12, 1119 (9th Cir. 1988).
109. 4 C.F.R. § 21.0-21.12 (1993); Tomaszczuk & Jensen, supra note 11, at 412-13.
"In contrast to the minimal impact of the 1987 amendments, changes to the GAO bid
protest regulations adopted in 1991 radically transformed bid protest procedures at
the GAO for the first time since CICA." Id. at 412.
110. See supra note 40.
111. Heroux centered around the DCAA audit of the government's cost estimate.
The protester utilized a protective order to compel full production of DCAA's audit
documentation. In addition, all parties participated in a hearing that further developed the record. Canadian Commercial CorpiHeroux, Inc., 72 Comp. Gen. 312, 93-2
CPD
144 (1994).
112. Pub. L. No. 102-396, 106 Stat. 1876 (1992).
113. 106 Stat. at 1924.
114. The government cost estimate was prepared and audited under the Cost Comparability Handbook developed by the Defense Depot Maintenance Council Cost Com-
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ble costs were added to the estimate, the DOD entity competed
with all other bidders.11 The Appropriations Act, however, excluded the application of A-76 and required that DCAA "certify
that the successful bids include comparable estimates of all direct and indirect costs for both public and private bids."1 '
The Air Force issued a solicitation to compete with Heroux's
landing gear maintenance contract and the Department of the
Air Force, Ogden Air Logistics Center, Financial Management
Plans and Program Division (FMP) submitted a proposal along
with Heroux and several other private bidders. The Air Force
determined that the FMP and Heroux proposals held the higher
technical merit and that technically, the two proposals were
"essentially" equal." 7 The deciding factor was cost, and FMP's
cost proposal was referred to DCAA for audit in compliance
with the Cost Comparability Handbook."' DCAA's audit found
FMP's proposal to have understated its labor costs by
$1,059,569, but reported that FMP's proposal "was acceptable
for evaluation.""9 The Air Force subsequently met with DCAA
to determine the reason for these apparently contradictory findings. DCAA explained that the "acceptable for evaluation" language certified FMP's bid at $14,139,712, which did not reflect
any adjustment for the understated labor costs. DCAA interpreted section 9095 of the Appropriations Act as requiring the
certification of all reasonable bids. Since the understated costs
amounted to under nine percent of DCAA's $15,426,575 cost
estimate, DCAA found FMP's costs to be "fairly represented."

parability Committee. 72 Comp. Gen. 312, 93-2 CPD T 144 (1994).
115. Id. In DWS, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-211950, Feb. 10, 1984, 84-1 CPD
164, GAO
found that the "supplement to A-76 (August 1983) permits the conversion of a contracted commercial activity after a contractor's performance becomes unsatisfactory
only if (1) recompetition with other sources fails to result in a reasonable price and
(2) a cost comparison of the activity indicates that it would be more economical to
perform the activity in-house."
116. Section 9095 stated "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, during the
current fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense may acquire the modification, depot
maintenance and repair of aircraft . . . through competition between Department of
Defense maintenance activities and private firms . . . ." 106 Stat. at 1924. See RJO
Enter., Comp. Gen. B-252232, 93-1 CPD T1446 (1993) (finding "notwithstanding any
other provision of law" to override the Small Business Act).
117. 72 Comp. Gen. 312, 93-2 CPD 1 144 (1994) (FMP scored 74 compared with
Heroux's 76).
118. Id.
119. Id.
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After this explanation, the Air Force awarded the work assignment to FMP without any cost adjustment.12
Heroux bid a firm fixed price of $15,237,394, and argued in
its protest that DCAA's construction of section 9095 was arbitrary and capricious in light of the findings of its own audit." DCAA responded that its audits are opinions and that
"auditors [have] substantial discretion to determine when, in
their professional opinion, a bid includes comparable costs."122
B. GAO's Application of Chevron
GAO found DCAA's certification of FMP's proposal at
$14,139,712 to be "unreasonable" given the section 9095 requirement that all costs--direct and indirect-were to be included in certified cost estimates. 12' Although GAO did not refer

to either the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or the Chevron" test (formulated to govern judicial review of agency action under the APA), their decision was clearly based upon the
application of this law. The application of Chevron is a two step
process:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the
court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose
its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary
in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather,
if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute."

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
467 U.S. at 842-43.
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Section 9095's legislative history consisted of one line in the
House Report--"Amends House provision to require DCAA to
certify that winning bids under public/private competitions have
included all labor and nonlabor costs."'26 The Heroux decision
does not indicate that GAO examined this history and found
that Congress had not directly addressed this issue, but there
can be no question but that it must have. GAO's non-bid protest legal functions require its lawyers to be experts in researching and interpreting legislative history, and GAO is the
repository of what may be the most complete collection of legislative histories.
In finding DCAA's action arbitrary and capricious, the Heroux
decision analogized the FMP proposal to that of a cost reimbursement type contract "because the government is not legally
obligated to pay a private firm more than the offered price,
while the government will pay for any cost overruns by a DOD
entity from public funds."'27 Recognizing the danger of substantial waste, GAO case law applies a strict level of accountability to agencies making cost reimbursement contract awards.
Heroux, in turn, applied this strict accountability to DCAA's
certification role holding "that FMP's proposal can only be certified by DCAA as including comparable estimates of all direct
and indirect costs at the upward adjusted price of
$15,426,575.,128 GAO ignored the traditional deference afforded an Executive agency's construction of a statute in which it is
authorized to administer in furtherance of its independent goal
of increased competition for public contracts.'2 9 The Ameron II
court considered GAO's CICA authority as a proper extension of
congressional authority promoting a purpose that justified any
disruption of the Executive Branch.' Heroux relies on the
importance of this purpose to invalidate DCAA's execution of
the law.

126. S. REP. No. 408, 102d Cong. 2d Sess. § 9095 (1992), reprinted in 1992 WL
373417, at *514 (Leg. Hist.).
127. 72 Comp. Gen. 312, 93-2 CPD % 144 (1994) (citing Hoboken Shipyards, Inc.,
Comp. Gen. B-224184.2, Jan. 20, 1987, 87-1 CPD
70 and Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., Comp. Gen. B-221888, July 2, 1986, 86-2 CPD T 23, affd
on recon., B-221888.2, Oct. 15, 1986, 86-2 CPD %1428).
128. Id.
129. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
130. Ameron, 809 F.2d at 997-98 (Ameron II).
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IV. JuDiciAL REVIEW
A. FederalAppeal
Heroux could be appealed to either the Court of Federal
Claims or federal district court assuming that DCAA loses its
pending reconsideration. 3 ' Given the nature of GAO reconsiderations, this seems a certainty.'3 2 However, the reconsideration must answer the question of what should be the proper
treatment of post-decision legislative history in a case decided
under Chevron. With the reconsideration of Heroux pending,
Congress has attempted to fill the void in section 9095's legislative history.
The conferees wish to clarify their intent that, for competitions carried out under this provision, DCAA audit reports
containing an opinion that a bid was prepared in accordance with the DOD Cost Comparability Handbook and is
acceptable for evaluation shall be considered a valid certification. The inclusion of findings questioning costs as either
understated or overstated are to be considered of an advisory nature only, unless specifically stated by DCAA."'
Traditionally, post-enactment legislative history has received
little weight, but the inclusion of this language in the 1994
DOD Appropriations Act Conference Report' 4 further marks
GAO's independence under Heroux. 55 GAO's certain denial of
131. Scanwell Lab. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Canadian Commercial
CorpJHeroux, Inc.-Reconsideration, Comp. Gen. B-2532.78.3, Apr. 7, 1994, 94-1 CPO
247, released well after the submission of this casenote, affirmed the original decision.
132. In 1988, GAO did not reverse a single decision despite the filing of 291
reconsiderations. 51 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 305 (Feb. 13, 1989). Out of 324
reconsiderations handled in 1987, one that was initially dismissed was sustained, two
dismissals were reinstated only to be denied on the merits, and four cases were affirmed with modification to the recommended remedy. 49 Fed Cont. Rep (BNA) 299
(Feb. 22, 1988).
133. 139 CONG. REC. 8978, 8991 (1993) (debating the DOD Appropriations Act of

1994).
134. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 339, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Conference Report on
H.R. 3116, Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1994).
135. In its reconsideration decision, GAO found the post-decision legislative history
to provide "no basis" for a reversal of a decision that "the Defense Contract Audit
Agency improperly certified the proposal of a DOD depot pursuant to section 9095 of
the 1993 DOD Appropriations Act, where the 1993 Appropriations Act language was
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the pending reconsideration will advance its independent authority to promote fair competition over both that of DCAA and
Congress. The conference report's "Depot Maintenance" subsection also "urge[d] the Department to improve its programs for
depot maintenance competition . . .""' Only through true independence can GAO ignore what is plainly direct congressional
influence designed to improve competition for depot maintenance contracts." 7
In participating in the reconsideration, DCAA has no doubt
also taken the opportunity to frame a deference argument for
appeal.'
Such an appeal would be received much more favorclear." Comp. Gen. B-253278.3, Apr. 7, 1994, 94-1 CPD %247.
We see no way to give effect to the contrary approach suggested by the
Conference Report accompanying the 1994 DOD Appropriations Act. As
stated above, we agree with DCAA's interpretation that in order for it to
comply with the requirement that it "certify that the successful bids
include comparable estimates of all direct and indirect costs," DCAA was
required to determine whether the successful offeror's costs were fairly
stated and reasonable.
Id.
136. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 339.
137. Id. The Heroux reconsideration addressed GAO's authority under CICA in the
following manner:
CICA provides that the Comptroller General shall decide protests "concerning an alleged violation of a procurement statute or regulation." The
1993 Appropriations Act is the statute that authorizes DOD to procure
the repair of aircraft components through competition between DOD depot maintenance activities and private firms and is therefore a "procurement statute." Thus, CICA grants our Office authority to consider protests that the 1993 Appropriations Act's certification requirements were
not followed.
Comp. Gen. B-253278.3 94-1 CPD
247 (citations omitted).
138. DCAA did in fact argue for deference on reconsideration and met this result:
DCAA's argument that we did not properly defer to its interpretation of
section 9095 of the 1993 Appropriations Act is predicated on DCAA's
misunderstanding of our decision . . .. [Olur determination that DCAA
did not act reasonably in certifying FMP's proposal was not based on an
interpretation of section 9095 of the 1993 Appropriations Act contrary to
that of DCAA's. Rather, we agreed with DCAA's position that under
section 9095 it was required to determine whether FMP's costs were
fairly stated or reasonable in order to certify FMP's proposal, but found
that DCAA's certification of FMP's proposal costs was contradicted by
DCAA's own findings, presented in its audit report, that showed FMP's
costs were not fairly stated or reasonable.
Id.
This attempt to clarify the issue of deference to DCAA's interpretation of section 9095 is a clear retreat from its application of Chevron in Heroux, but is illustrative of the difficult position of GAO in an APA review of agency statutory interpreta-
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ably in a federal district court than the Court of Federal
Claims. The Court of Federal Claims has retained a deferential
position toward review of GAO decisions, 39 but the majority
of federal district courts and the District of Columbia Circuit
have retreated from GAO deference viewing its decisions as
only advisory opinions. 40 A federal district court appeal of
Heroux will present the question: what weight if any should
GAO's expert opinion on DCAA's interpretation of section 9095
be given under Chevron? GAO will no doubt argue for deference
from the reviewing court-perhaps using Chevron as well.'4 '
Deference to the Heroux decision will require the reviewing
court to follow the decision unless it lacks a rational basis-clearly, an impossibility. A federal court cannot be bound
by an agency's application of Supreme Court law. Deference to
GAO, it would seem, is not possible in a Heroux appeal regardless of the forum.
Federal court review will reapply Chevron to the facts of the
protest, but it is doubtful whether GAO's cost reimbursement
contract analysis would convince the reviewing court.
The

tion. GAO now holds that DCAA's interpretation of its own audit data is unreasonable given GAO's caselaw concerning the certification required of bids by DOD entities and the cost reimbursement nature of these estimates. Id. (citing Hoboken Shipyards, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-224184.2, Jan. 20, 1987, 87-1 CPD
70 and Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., Comp. Gen. B-221888, July 2, 1986, 86-2 CPD 91
23, af/d on recon., B-221888.2, Oct. 15, 1986, 86-2 CPD 91428). On Appeal, DCAA
can now challenge GAO's lack of deference to DCAA's authority to interpret its own
audit findings as well as lack of deference to DCAA's construction of section 9095's
certification requirement.
139. Commercial Energies, Inc. v. United States, Cl. Ct. No. 90-300, Apr. 16, 1990,
36 CCF 9 75,846 (requiring that GAO's decisions be upheld unless irrational); accord
Heath Sys. Mktg. & Dev. Corp. v. United States, Cl. Ct. No. 91-1116, Sept. 30, 1992,
26 Cl. Ct. 1322.
140. See Rapides Regional Medical Ctr. v. Secretary Dept. of Veteran Affairs, 974
F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1992); Irvin Industries Canada, Ltd. v. United States Air Force,
924 F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Delta Data Sys. Corp. v. Webster, 744 F.2d 197 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); and Technology for Communications Intl, Inc. v. Garrett, 783 F. Supp.
1446 (D.D.C. 1992) for cases abandoning the deference forwarded in Wheelabrator
Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d. 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971) and M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans,
455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
141. GAO does not consider the APA to apply to its bid protest decisions. Polaroid
Corp.-Reconsideration, Comp. Gen. B-209753.2, Jan. 10, 1983, 83-1 CPD 9124. "The
simple answer to this assertion is that the General Accounting Office, as a legislative
branch organization, is not subject to the APA. Moreover, the APA generally does not
apply to matters involving public contracts." Id. (citations omitted).
142. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Md., Inc. v. HHS, 718 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1989)
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court will defer to DCAA's attempted construction of section
9095.14' The possibility of waste that controlled GAO's Chev-

ron analysis will certainly receive consideration, but the court
could easily place the burden of cost reimbursement accountability on the contracting officer's determination not to adjust
FMP's cost proposal upward and uphold DCAA's action.'" The
post-decision legislative history clearly suggested this result.
B. ConstitutionalImplications
The 1994 DOD Appropriations Act " 5 rendered moot any
constitutional challenge to GAO's authority to declare DCAA's
section 9095 construction unreasonable. Under the 1994 Appropriations Act, DCAA's certification role is filled by the Senior
Acquisition Executive or a delegate.'" Any separation of powers challenge must wait for GAO to apply Heroux, but if it
continues to provide a forum for APA review of agency action
related to government contracting, 47 GAO may be vulnerable
to two distinct separation of powers challenges." One of the
Department of Justice's challenges in Ameron 11 was that CICA

(applying a strict standard of review to a contracting officer's decision when awarding
a cost-reimbursement contract).
143. See Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of
Powers in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. Rev. 757 (1991), for an analysis of the
Supreme Court's application of Chevron which has been marked by substantial deference.
144. GAO has consistently placed the responsibility for conducting and acting on
an accurate cost realism analysis upon the contracting officer even when a DCAA's
audit has proved inaccurate. Purvis Sys. Inc., 71 Comp. Gen. 203, 92-1 CPD
132
(1992); Marine Animal Prod. Intl, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-247150.2, July 13, 1992, 92-2
CPD % 16; American Management Sys., Inc., 70 Comp. Gen. 510, 91-1 CPD %1492
(1991); General Research Corp., 70 Comp. Gen. 279, 91-1 CPD
183 (1991).
145. Pub. L. No. 103-139, 107 Stat. 1418 (1993).
146. Id. at 1455 § 8068.
147. E.g., Sargent Controls & Aerospace, Comp. Gen. B-254976, Feb. 2, 1994, 94-1
CPD I (sustaining protest of section 9095 procurement where DCAA certified the
proposal as "acceptable for evaluation" without conducting a cost realism analysis).
148. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2298, 2310 (1991) [hereinafter Metropolitan]. "Time and again
we have reaffirmed the importance in our constitutional scheme of the separation of
governmental powers into the three coordinate branches." Id.; see also Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (citing Morrision v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693
(1988); Bowsher v. Synor, 478 U.S. 714, 725 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 96
(1976); Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935)); THE FEDERALIST No. 47
(James Madison).
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granted GAO the authority to execute federal procurement law.
This challenge never reached the Supreme Court and more recent separation of powers cases in no way preclude its renewal.
The second possible challenge is to the activist role GAO took
in deciding Heroux. APA challenges are a form of Article III
judicial review of agency action, and by continuing to provide
the relief granted Heroux, GAO could face claims that its bid
protest function is an Article I judicial entity improperly exercising Article III authority.
1. Article II Execution?
Turning first to the question of GAO's execution of federal
procurement laws under CICA, INS v. Chadha limited
Congress' exercise of Legislative authority to the "single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure[s]" of Article
I. Considerations of efficiency and efficacy were held to be
secondary to the preservation of the inherent checks and balances of our tripartite government. 5 ' Under Bowsher v.
Synar, "Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal
of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by
impeachment," 5 ' and as an officer removable by joint resolution of Congress, the Comptroller General cannot constitutionally be vested with "executive power."'52 The Court's decision in
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the

149. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
150. Id. at 959.
The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional Convention impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously
made by men who had lived under a form of government that permitted
arbitrary acts to go unchecked. There is no support ...
for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often encountered in complying
with explicit Constitutional standards may be avoided, either by Congress
or by the President.

Id.
151. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726.
152. Id. at 730; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 686 (distinguishing Bowsher from the
challenge to independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978
since an independent counsel is removable by the President (not Congress) for good
cause); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (striking as unconstitutional a

statute that required the advice and consent of the Senate prior to the removal of
certain postmasters).
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Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. (Metropolitan) combined the
Chadha and Bowsher holdings to create a strict test of possible
separation of powers violations by the Legislative Branch:
If the power is executive, the Constitution does not permit
an agent of Congress to exercise it. If the power is legislative, Congress must exercise it in conformity with the
bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I § 7.
In short, when Congress "[takes] action that ha[s] the pur-

pose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons

. . .

outside the Legislative Branch," it

must take that action by the procedures authorized by the
Constitution.153
This test seriously questions the Ameron II court's vision of
GAO's bid protest function as a proper extension of congres-

sional authority, but would not fully resolve the questions presented by a CICA challenge. Despite apparently constructing a
bright line standard, the Court continues to recognize the necessity of some overlap among the three branches as each
works to perform effectively its constitutional role.5 4 The
framers' intent to create an integrated government with power
spread among three overlapping branches thereby preventing
tyranny has long been applied to separation of powers issues.'55 One of the earliest of these cases, Humphrey's Executor v. United States, concerned the constitutionality of congressional restrictions on presidential power to remove members of
the FTC.'56
Created by the Federal Trade Commission Act, the
Commission's members were removable by the President only
for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."'57
153. Metropolitan, 111 S. Ct. at 2312 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952-55).
154. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380. The Court has rejected a strict interpretation of

separation of powers in favor of Madisonian flexibility. See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm'r of
General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974).

155. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 635 (1952). "While the
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that
practice will integrate the dispersed power into a workable government. It enjoins
upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Id. at
635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
156. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
157. Id. at 620 (citing Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, §, 38 Stat. 717, 718 (codified
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The Court found the Commission authorized to act "in part
quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-judicially" 58 and that
"[tihe authority of Congress, in creating quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of
their duties independently of executive control cannot well be
doubted."" 9 The separation of powers analysis applied today
no longer "turn[s] on the labeling of an activity."6 ' Instead,
challenged statutes are examined for possible impact on the
function of a particular branch or the tripartite structure as a
aggrandizewhole.'' The Court's focus is on "encroachment or
62
ment of one branch at the expense of the other."
A successful Article II challenge to GAO's "execution" of federal procurement law under CICA must demonstrate that
GAO's bid protest function impedes Executive Branch performance of its constitutional duty.16 Factors that the Supreme
Court has considered in evaluating possible Executive Branch
interference are whether the statute presents a "dange[r] of
congressional usurpation,... impermissibly undermine[s]' the
powers of the Executive Branch, . . . [or] . . . disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches [by] prevent[ing]
the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally
assigned functions." 64 Where Congress has only reserved response and reporting requirements in a particular provision,

at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-42 (1988)).
158. Id. at 628.
159. Id. at 629.
160. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989);
We undoubtedly did rely on the terms "quasi-legislative" and quasi-judicial" to distinguish the officials involved in Humphrey's Executor and
Wiener from those in Myers, but our present considered view is that the
determination of whether the Constitution allows Congress to impose a
"good cause"-type restriction on the President's power to remove an official cannot be made to turn on whether or not that official is classified
as "purely executive." The analysis contained in our removal cases is
designed not to define rigid categories of those officials who may or may
not be removed at will by the President, but to ensure that Congress
does not interfere with the President's exercise of the "executive power"
and his constitutionally appointed duty to "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed" under Article II.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-90 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
161. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 382; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685-96.

162. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35 (1976).
163. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691.

164. Id. at 694-96 (citations omitted).
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there is no unconstitutional interference with Executive Branch
functions.165
Although Congress' removal authority over the Comptroller
General is not limited only to impeachment power, it is limited
to grounds of "permanent disability; inefficiency; neglect of duty;
malfeasance; or a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude."'66 This power is almost identical to that given the President under the Federal Trade Commission Act, and it follows
that GAO enjoys substantial independence as a result. Further,
GAO's bid protest function enjoys more independence than the
rest of the agency which investigates, audits, and evaluates
agencies and issues for Congress.'6 7 CICA merely codified
authority that GAO has exercised since 1921.168 The seventythree year evolution of GAO's bid protest forum has been controlled not by Congress but by the growth of the Executive
Branch with its resulting contract needs and problems.
During this long history, the Executive Branch has turned to
GAO for a final resolution of bid protests and as a result
achieved its procurement needs. Each GAO bid protest decision
provides recommendations that the agency may follow to complete its contracting effort.'69 GAO's bid protest forum has
evolved with the Executive Branch and in the process has become an integral part of federal contracting. Certainly, the
small success rate of protesters at GAO is direct evidence of
GAO's utility for contracting agencies. 7 ° While CICA did shift
GAO's focus from protecting public accounts to promoting fair
competition, it provides no basis upon which to ignore history

165. Id. at 694.
166. 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1) (1988).
167. One interesting example of the independence of the Procurement Law Division
of the Office of General Counsel which performs GAO's bid protest work is that in
the thirteen years Comptroller General Charles A. Bowsher has served, he has never
signed a bid protest decision. Although his name appears on many decisions and all
where the protest is sustained, his Special Assistant or the General Counsel has
always signed for him. MOSHER, supra note 5, at 136-163 (describing the development
of the audit and evaluation work done by GAO since 1950). In addition to the preparation of reports and testimony resulting from issue area work, GAO has statutory
audit and reporting requirements. 31 U.S.C. §§ 712-20 (1988).
168. See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
169. Unless the protest is dismissed or denied not on the merits. See 4 C.F.R. §
21.3 (1993).
170. See supra note 37.
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and declare that GAO review of bid protests impedes the constitutional function of the Executive.17 ' This argument is particularly implausible in light of the ninety-day statutory deadline imposed on GAO decisionmakers. Fair competition for government contracts can only impede the policies and practices
that led to the waste that motivated congressional contract
reform. CICA threatens only to usurp wasteful federal spending
and provide Congress with information vital to the continued
refining of public contract law, not to encroach on Executive authority.
2. Improper Article III Power?
Congress not only has the authority to regulate the jurisdiction 7 2 and procedure 7 3 of Article III courts, but it may also
create courts under Article I. ' This authority ends, however,
where Congress seeks to remove any matter that is traditionally the subject of suit "at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty" from Article III decision and place it within the purview
of an Article I court. 75 Where the matter removed from Article III review is a private, common law right, Article I judicial
delegations are even more suspect.'76 Montesquieu's maxim,

171. Again, CICA merely codified a shift which began with GAO review of A-76
protests. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
172. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
284 (1856) (upholding the establishment of procedures outside Article III for the collection of a customs debt).
173. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (upholding rules promulgated
under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934).
174. E.g. Atlas Roofing Co. v Occupational Safety and Health Review Comn'n, 430
U.S. 442 (1977) (upholding Article I judicial assignment under the Occupational
Health and Safety Act); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397 (1973) (Congress
has authority to "exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever" in the District of Columbia); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (upholding the
creation of the War Claims Commission to adjudicate claims of World War II veterans); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933) (finding the Court of Claims to
be a legislative court); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932) (defining the publicrights doctrine which establishes Legislative authority over matters arising between
government and individuals granted a public right); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26
U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (observing complete congressional authority to create territorial courts not in conformity with Article III).
175. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284.
176. Northern Pipeline Constr. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84 (1982)
(striking the Bankruptcy Reform Act's designation of bankruptcy courts as Article I

818

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:787

"[w]ere the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control,
for the judge would then be the legislator," aptly describes the
basis for these Article III concerns.' 77 CICA provided the statutory authority and judicial framework for GAO's activism in
Heroux and if GAO continues to provide APA review of agency
interpretations of statutory authority as it did in Heroux, clearly it will adjudicate traditional Article III claims.
Under CICA, GAO is required to determine whether the
"protested procurement action has involved government noncompliance with statutes or regulations," but neither the statute
nor the legislative history mention statutory interpretation or
the application of federal case law.'7 8 GAO's activism may
constitute the improper exercise of Article III power, but there
has been no express congressional assignment of this power. A
successful challenge to this activism, therefore, must either establish that GAO's bid protest function is under the supervision
and control of Congress or that CICA was an overly broad
grant of judicial authority.
Although the Comptroller General 'is an agent of Congress,
he does not serve at the will of the Congress. As a result, GAO
is an independent agency within the Legislative Branch. Within
this independent agency, the bid protest function operates as an
independent regulatory agency resolving disputes and developing case law for the government procurement industry.'79 The
history of Executive agency reliance on this independence and
compliance with this regulation cast grave doubt on the success
of any challenge alleging congressional control of bid protest
decisions. 80
adjuncts of federal district courts).
177. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 248 (James Madison) (Basil Blackwell ed., 2d ed.
1987).
178. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1435 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 2123. GAO has recognized res judicata in decisions from the D.C.
Circuit. 62 Comp. Gen. 399 (1983). GAO extends the same deference to the Court of
Federal Claims. 47 Comp. Gen. 573 (1968). In deciding protests, GAO will defer to
federal court rulings where they concern procurement. Tieder & Tracy, supra note 38,
at 100.
179. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1313-15 (1971), 455 F.2d at 131315 (recognizing GAO's long history and extensive case law); see also Fed. Cont. Rep.
(BNA) 5 (Feb. 8, 1993) (GAO received a record 3,258 protests in 1992 and closed
3,167).
180. "Once the procedures outlined in CICA are enacted, however, Congress has no
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On the issue of an overly broad grant of judicial authority,
Supreme Court case law specifically upholds the creation of
forums of the type authorized under CICA. Where the assignment involves claims of public right in a "particularized area of
law," the Court has consistently denied Article III separation of
powers challenges. 8 ' These assignments are governed by the
public-rights doctrine which "extends only to matters arising
'between the Government and persons subject to its authority
in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments,' and only to
matters that historically could have been determined exclusively
by those departments."'8 2 CICA's codification of GAO's sixtyfour year old judicial authority and the denial of Article III
review for protesters before 1970 unquestionably place GAO's
bid protest authority under the public-rights doctrine. 8 '
GAO's particularized area of law was also defined well before

involvement whatsoever in the procurement process. Congressional influence is completely excluded from the bid protest process, unlike the legislative veto procedure
struck down in Chadha." Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,
607 F. Supp. 962, 973 (D.N.J. 1985).
181. Northern Pipeline Constr. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85 (1982).
See also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851-53 (1986);
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67-70; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932). Compare Kevin T. Abikoff, Note, The Role of the Comptroller General in Light of Bowsher
v. Synar, 87 COLUm. L. REV. 1539, 1548 n.71 (1987), which concludes that GAO's bid
protest function is constitutional based on Schor's divergence from Northern Pipeline
and Crowell. Abikoff argues that the constitutionality of GAO's bid protest function
can be established by meeting a two-step analysis. "First, it must be established if
the function being delegated is quasi-judicial. Second, if the function is quasi-judicial,
the extent of the tribunal's power and the nature of the claim to be adjudicated must
pass the Schor balancing test." Id. at 1551 (footnote omitted). The commentator defines the test as follows:
The Schor balancing test is two pronged, as it examines the extent of
the tribunal's power and the nature of the claim to be adjudicated. A
non-article III tribunal is more likely to be constitutional where it exercises powers of a limited scope and in a narrow subject area. Moreover,
it is less offensive to article HI where the claim has historically been
heard by other than an article III comt, the suit is not to vindicate a
constitutional right, and it is impracticable for Congress to vest the particular power in an article III court.
Id. at 1548.
182. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67-68 (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50).
183. In granting APA standing to disappointed bidders, the Scanwell Court found
these protesters to be acting as "private attorney general[s]." Scanwell Lab. v.
Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 864 (D.D.C. 1970).

820

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:787

CICA's passage. GAO's activism is strictly limited to procure-

ment matters.
Other factors that the Court has considered in upholding
Article I judicial functions that are relevant to GAO's CICA role
are the fact GAO bid protest decisions are only recommendations' and the fact that the parties involved in a bid protest
choose to submit the matter to GAO.' 85 If protest is filed with
GAO and then subsequently one of the parties files in a federal
district court, GAO will dismiss the protest unless the federal
court requests that it make a decision." 6
V.

CONCLUSION

Heroux illustrates GAO's evolutionary paradox-increased
activism results in increased congressional pressure. GAO relies
on the possibility of future congressional action to enforce its
recommendations. This dependency and GAO's non-bid protest
role as the investigative arm of Congress preclude the total independence that the bid protest function deserves and preserve
separation of powers questions for possible Executive challenge.
It is ironic that under the contract initiative at issue in Heroux,
bureaucrats were considered independent enough to review
impartially a bid prepared by an adjacent office, yet questions
remain about GAO's bid protest function despite seventy-three
years of independent decisionmaking.
Heroux's significance may simply lie in the type of jurisprudence used to decide it, yet it also typifies the likely form that
an increasing number of future protests will take. These protests and the A-76 protests before them are the clear result of
government contract reform-Executive and Legislative. Thus,
the overlap Madison envisioned between branches is redefined.
In its dual role as an independent Legislative Branch agency
and an Executive Branch utility, GAO strives to serve the best

184. Schor, 478 U.S. at 853.
185. Id. at 855.
186. 4 C.F.R. §§ 21.3 (m)(11), 21.9 (1993).
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interests of government while walking a precarious middle
ground.

John M. Holloway III

